Can foreign nationals work in German aerospace and defence?

A company working in aerospace or defence does not automatically mean that every employee requires security clearance.

Consider a hypothetical aerospace company with several teams. One engineer develops components for commercial aircraft. Another works on a commercial telecommunications satellite. A third works on a classified Bundeswehr satellite programme. All three may work for the same company, but the security requirements attached to their positions can be completely different.

Airbus is a useful real-world illustration. Its German operations span commercial aircraft, helicopters, defence and space. Airbus's careers FAQ states that candidates may apply for roles outside their home country provided they meet the requirements of the individual position, while its Defence and Space careers information makes clear that some roles in classified business areas require security clearance.

The principle this demonstrates is simple: restrictions generally need to be assessed at position and programme level, not simply at company level.

The central federal legislation is the German Security Clearance Act — the Sicherheitsüberprüfungsgesetz, or SÜG. Section 1 sets out its purpose and scope: it applies to people who are to be entrusted with a security-sensitive activity.

In practice, the Act applies where a person has or could obtain access to classified information designated VS-VERTRAULICH, GEHEIM or STRENG GEHEIM. It also covers certain classified information belonging to international or supranational organisations, where Germany is required to allow access only to appropriately security-screened individuals.

That is particularly relevant to aerospace and defence businesses participating in German government, military or international programmes.

• VS-VERTRAULICH
• GEHEIM
• STRENG GEHEIM

A common misconception is that German security clearance is categorically limited to German citizens. That is not correct — German rules explicitly contemplate foreign nationals undergoing security screening.

The administrative regulation implementing the SÜG (SÜG-AVV) draws an especially important distinction: where a foreign national is to perform security-sensitive activities in Germany's interest, including obtaining access to German or certain foreign classified information, that person can be screened under the German Security Clearance Act unless a bilateral or multilateral agreement provides otherwise.

The security declaration itself, governed by section 13 SÜG, also requires applicants to disclose current, former and additional nationalities — a disclosure obligation, not an exclusion.

So foreign nationality does not, by itself, make German security clearance impossible. There can nevertheless be complications: foreign connections, residence history and other circumstances can become relevant to the assessment, and international programmes may be governed by separate bilateral or multilateral security arrangements.

For recruiters, the practical lesson is that "requires security clearance" should not be silently translated into "German nationals only".

Aerospace and defence projects frequently cross national borders. A single programme may involve German classified information, NATO information, EU classified information, another country's classified information, or technology supplied under another country's export-control regime.

In those situations, additional programme-specific rules or international agreements may determine who can access particular information. It is therefore possible for someone to be eligible to work for an aerospace company in Germany — and potentially even satisfy German security requirements — while still being unable to participate in one particular programme.

That does not mean the individual cannot work for the company. It may simply mean they work on another project.

Security clearance is only one part of the picture. Germany also operates an extensive export-control regime administered by the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle, or BAFA). Aerospace and space companies frequently work with technology that has both civilian and military applications — commonly described as dual-use technology.

A common misconception is that an export only happens when a physical component leaves Germany. Technology can also be transferred through information. BAFA's Export Control and Academia manual — written for research institutions, but a very clear illustration of how broadly technical assistance can operate — gives examples of technology transfer including:

• instruction and training
• technical consultation
• presentations and meetings
• discussions concerning source code or test results
• internships
• supervision of researchers
• web conferences
• permitting access to computers containing sensitive information

This is why sophisticated aerospace organisations run internal export-control systems governing who may access which technology. But that still does not produce a simple rule that foreign employees cannot access aerospace technology. The actual technology, destination, end use, sanctions position and licensing requirements all need to be assessed.

Recruiters familiar with the US aerospace market should be particularly careful here. American aerospace job advertisements frequently carry requirements tied to ITAR (the International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and "U.S. person" status, and it is tempting to transfer that logic straight into European recruitment.

The German and EU systems work differently. There is no universal German equivalent under which working with aerospace technology automatically requires someone to be a "German person" or "EU person". Instead, employers need to answer several separate questions:

• Does the position involve classified information?
• Does it require a German security clearance?
• Is controlled military or dual-use technology involved?
• Does an international programme impose additional access requirements?
• Does a particular export-control authorisation affect access?

Only after answering those questions can an employer determine whether nationality actually creates a restriction for that specific role.

Imagine a Brazilian aerospace engineer living legally in Germany. She has five years of experience developing satellite mechanisms and applies to a German space company. Rejecting her simply because "we work in aerospace" would misunderstand the regulatory framework.

Suppose the company has three vacancies. Position A covers commercial satellite mechanisms: no classified information, no programme-specific nationality restriction — she may be perfectly eligible. Position B involves dual-use satellite technology: the export-control team needs to establish what technology is involved and whether access or technical assistance triggers licensing or compliance requirements, and nationality alone still does not decide the answer. Position C sits on a classified European defence satellite: clearance and programme-specific requirements apply, so the employer has to establish whether she can obtain the necessary clearance and whether the programme itself adds nationality restrictions.

The correct recruitment decision can therefore be different for each position — inside the same aerospace company.

Before excluding candidates on nationality, establish the actual requirement behind the restriction. Instead of asking "do we need an EU citizen?", ask "what specifically prevents a non-EU citizen from performing this role?" The answer is usually one of the following:

• immigration and right-to-work requirements
• German security clearance
• access to classified information
• export-control restrictions
• a customer requirement
• NATO or EU security rules
• a specific bilateral or multinational programme agreement

If none of those underlying restrictions exists, limiting recruitment to German or EU nationals unnecessarily shrinks an already limited talent pool.

Foreign nationals can work in Germany's aerospace, space and defence industries. The fact that a company operates in defence or space does not mean all of its positions are restricted to German or EU nationals. Certain positions do carry legitimate restrictions — classified information, clearance requirements, controlled technology, programme-specific rules — and those must be respected.

For candidates, being a non-EU citizen should not automatically discourage an application to a German aerospace company. For recruiters and hiring managers, the point is equally important: don't turn a project-specific compliance requirement into a company-wide nationality restriction.

Understanding exactly where a restriction originates opens access to a substantially larger international talent pool while keeping the process compliant. It is the same principle we apply when running embedded search for space hardware manufacturers in Germany: define the constraint per role, not per company.